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of US-Japan alliance cooperation in the East Asia and globally in "out of area" contingencies; and, after October 2006, in even precipitating some Japanese policy-makers' talk of reconsidering their state's non-nuclear stance.
In turn, the paper attempts to provide a sober assessment of how far ranging these changes are in terms of influencing Japan's fundamental long-term strategic trajectory and moving toward becoming a more "normal" military actor and US alliance partner. It argues that the perceived threat from North Korea has indeed contributed strongly to propelling Japan toward becoming a state increasingly prepared to use force to deter security threats from other states and to some degree non-state actors. However, the paper also stresses that Japan continues to push forward its defense posture in an incremental fashion; that it remains wary of the risks of military confrontation with the North; and that as yet it sees the nuclear threat from North Korea as insufficient to force it to seriously reconsider its nuclear option.
Just as importantly, this paper seeks to explain why the perceived North Korean threat has impacted so significantly on Japanese security policy, despite the fact that its impact is arguably disproportionate to the magnitude of the actual threat posed to Japan militarily. The paper stresses that for Japan the North Korean threat is multiplied, or "super-sized", in impact by its multilayered nature.
Firstly, Japan certainly faces a growing degree of existential military threats and legitimate security concerns from the North's missile and nuclear capabilities. But, secondly, for Japan this threat is unduly accentuated by the fact that the North has repeatedly exerted an alliance political-military threat to the solidarity of the US-Japan alliance, thus threatening to undermine the very foundation of Japan's post-war security policy. As explained in later sections, North Korea has shown itself adept at generating for Japan alliance dilemmas of entrapment and particularly abandonment by generating and exploiting differences of threat 3 perception between the bilateral allies. 4 In instances of feared entrapment, Japan has moved to to strengthen its autonomous defense options. Japan's principal concerns of abandonment, however, have necessitated moves on its part to shore up political confidence in US-Japan bilateral security ties by indicating that it is prepared to undertake additional alliance commitments. In certain cases these alliance commitments are designed to directly counter the threat from North Korea. But in others they are designed to demonstrate a willingness to support the US in dealing with other regional and global contingencies that are of greater importance to the US than Japan, in the hope that this will ensure US reciprocation to support Japan against North Korea. Japan's motivations to support the US-led "war on terror" through the dispatch of the JSDF to Iraq between [2004] [2005] [2006] , and to thus take on a greater global security role, as will be argued below, can in large part be interpreted in the light of the need to strengthen alliance solidarity to respond to North Korea. The North's suspected and then later revealed involvement in the abductions of Japanese citizens has led to its increasing labeling in domestic political discourse as a "terrorist" state. 6 The consequence has been to engender an increasingly hard-line approach toward North Korea amongst Japan's policy-makers and citizenry. Although Japan's policy-makers and citizenry have some legitimate grounds to fear the North's penetration of Japanese internal pp. 325-338. 6 David Leheny, Think Global, Fear Local: Sex, Violence and Anxiety in Contemporary Japan (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 155-171. 4 security, it is also the case that anti-North Korean sentiment, stoked by Japanese conservative politicians such as former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and the mass media, has at times bordered on an irrational hysteria regarding the level of actual threat posed by the North. The consequence has been for Japanese policy-makers to enhance diplomatic, economic and military pressure on the North, even when other states are looking to turn toward engagement.
Hence, even though Prime Ministers Koizumi Junicihirō and then later Fukuda Yasuo have sought to engage the North in order for Japan not to fall behind its partners in the Six Party Talks (SPT) process, Japan in recent years has found it increasingly difficult to promote bilateral normalization talks.
Fourthly, North Korea's poor standing in Japan and internationally has meant that it has often been utilized by policy-makers as a convenient proxy threat to legitimize the pushing through of changes in Japanese security policy that are as equally or more directed toward dealing with other forms of potential and existential threats, but which are politically and diplomatically unacceptable to identify explicitly. In particular, Japanese policy-makers have manipulated the North Korean threat as a means to camouflage the fact that many of its military procurement activities and moves to upgrade the US-Japan alliance are actually designed at the same time to deal with the increasing and longer term threat from China.
Hence, this paper argues that even if the military threat from North Korea is not sufficient prima facie to justify Japan's attachment of preeminence to it above all other extant threats, it has nevertheless succeeded out of all proportion in serving as the key driver for Japan's normalization agenda.
Japan's Post-War Security Trajectory
Japan's security policy throughout the post-cold war period has involved the pursuit of Japan's government has interpreted the Constitution as permitting the maintenance of military forces for the purposes of the defense of its own national territory, and during the Cold War built up a substantial military to counter the threat from the USSR. However, the JSDF has remained highly restricted in its activities and capabilities by a range of antimilitaristic prohibitions derived from interpretations of Article 9. Japan has elaborated a doctrine of "exclusively defense-oriented defense" which has meant that it has eschewed the acquisition of weaponry that might be used for offensive purposes and power projection capabilities such as inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), ballistic missiles, long-range strategic bombers, in-flight refueling aircraft or aircraft carriers. In turn, Japan has argued that, even though it possesses the right of collective self-defense under the UN Charter, it is prohibited from exercising this right as this would exceed constitutional interpretations that limit Japan's use of military force to the minimum necessary for self-defense. In practice, this has meant that Japan has been reluctant to dispatch the JSDF overseas on anything other than 6 the exclusively peaceful use of space; the three non-nuclear principles of 1967 not to "produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons"; and the one per cent Gross National Product (GNP) limit on defense expenditure.
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In turn, Japan's limited national military capabilities have meant that it has in large part entrusted its defense to the mechanism of the US-Japan security treaty. Japan and the US have traditionally predicated their security treaty upon a grand strategic bargain: Japan accepting US military protection in return for its provision of bases to facilitate the projection of US military power in East Asia. Japan has attempted to temper its reliance on the US security guarantee, however, by the build-up of its own national defense capabilities and indigenous defense production, and by careful hedging against the dual alliance dilemmas of "entrapment" and "abandonment" in US regional and global military strategy. Regarding entrapment, Japan has long feared that it could become a proxy target in a nuclear exchange between the USSR or China and the US; and also that the US might look to in effect "press gang" Japan into assisting its military to once again fight wars on the Korean Peninsula or East Asian continent. 9 Regarding abandonment, Japan has known that the US as a superpower has global interests which supersede those of Japan, and hence that the US in the service of its wider strategic interests might look to reach an accommodation with states posing a threat to Japan, or downgrade alliance ties if Japan is no longer seen as an indispensable ally in its overall regional and global strategy. Guidelines on planning for Article 5-type contingencies under the security treaty designed to defend Japan itself, and failed to conduct research into Article 6-type contingencies designed to support the US to respond to regional contingencies in East Asia. Japan's military security role in the Cold War was thus geographically restricted to the area immediately surrounding Japan; limited functionally to providing a defensive "shield" around its own territory to assist the US offensive "sword" in Northeast Asia; and highly asymmetrical within the alliance in that Japan was not obligated to defend the US outside its own territory. Taepodong-1 missile in August 1998 over Japanese "airspace". For Japanese policy-makers the North Korean missile threat was then confirmed by the test of July 2006 of seven missiles, including the Taepodong-2 with a potential range of up to 6,000 kilometers. 14 Japan is concerned that North Korea might deploy these missiles with conventional high explosive warheads, or mounting its known stocks of chemical and biological weapons, and that despite their relative inaccuracy the missiles would pose a significant threat to Japan's civilian population concentrated in easily targeted dense urban areas.
Last but certainly not least, Japanese policy-makers fear that North Korea will eventually look to combine its missile capabilities with its newly acquired nuclear weapons technology. Japan has certainly looked on askance as the North has pushed forward its nuclear program since the mid-1990s, and reacted strongly to the nuclear test of October 2006. The ultimate Japanese fear is that North Korea may eventually learn to fully master and miniaturize nuclear weapons technology and use this as a means to exert "nuclear blackmail" on Japan.
Japan thus has genuine grounds for viewing North Korea as an existential threat to its security. But at the same time it is important to note that the North's military threat to Japan and its neighbors per se is regarded by many analysts as still quite moderate, if not in decline in certain ways. Japanese analysts of a more critical disposition have pointed to North Korea's declining conventional capabilities, resulting from the North's reliance on ageing technologies and lack of funding to equip and train its military. The North's ballistic missiles are a threat, but their actual capabilities, accuracy and reliability are highly questionable.
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The North Korean nuclear program is, of course, a major concern for the future, but Japanese analysts and policy-makers entertain some confidence that the North is still far from fully mastering nuclear weapons technologies and from miniaturizing nuclear devices for mounting on ballistic missiles. Hence, on paper, North Korea's existential threat by most calculations is as yet moderate and not a fundamental threat to Japanese national survival, and its current capabilities are likely no match for the defensive capabilities of the JSDF, and no certainly no match for the overwhelming conventional and nuclear offensive retaliatory power of US forces in Japan and in the surrounding region. If the accentuated impact of the North Korean threat on Japan is to be fully explained, it is thus necessary to look beyond just the North's extant military capabilities and to examine how these capabilities, crucially in combination with other threat multipliers, have inflated the overall threat.
North Korean Threat Multipliers

North Korea's Threat to the US-Japan Alliance
The combination of existential military threats that North Korea presents has been magnified unduly and pushed up the Japanese security agenda because it complicates the alliance basis of Japan's security policy and revives dilemmas of entrapment and abandonment. Once again, entrapment has been a generally lesser concern for Japanese policy-makers; although, as explained shortly, alarm bells were rung by the 1994 nuclear crisis and US requests to activate the security treaty to enable Japan to provide support in the event of a Korean Peninsula contingency, thus raising the risk of Japanese embroilment in a By and large, though, Japan's alliance security concerns have concentrated on North Korea's capability to threaten to drive a wedge between Japanese and the US interests, and to thereby raise fears of abandonment for Japan. North Korea first demonstrated this capability during the nuclear crisis of the mid-1990s. As noted above, the principal concerns of the US in contemplating military action to force North Korea to desist from its nuclear program were focused on preserving stability on the Korean Peninsula and halting the process of nuclear proliferation, and were therefore broadly regional and global in nature. By contrast, Japan's security priorities at this time were focused predominantly on its own national security. The divergence of security priorities was then to be revealed in the wake of US requests in mid-1994 for its Japanese ally to provide logistical support to US forces under the security treaty to respond to North Korea. However, as outlined earlier, Japan's largely exclusive focus up until that point on Article 5 of the security treaty and on Defense Guidelines planning for the defense solely of Japan, meant that it was unable to respond to the US's Article 6-based requests concerned with Japanese support for responding to regional contingencies that might impact upon its own national security. The consequence was that the US-Japan alliance was exposed by North Korea as a largely empty construct in responding to regional crises. Japan's failure to be seen to back its ally in the North Korean nuclear crisis, coupled with the eruption of domestic opposition to US bases on Okinawa in 1995, triggered a crisis of political has not always been matched by a similar US resolve and hard-line approach. In the wake of the North Korean nuclear test, for instance, Japanese policy-makers were considering utilizing legislation in line with the Defense Guidelines to back a US economic blockade of the North.
But the US soon made it clear that, following its conclusion that it needed to pursue to a diplomatic solution to the North's nuclear program, it was not prepared as yet to exert military pressure on the North.
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In turn, the US's desire for a diplomatic solution has meant that since February 2007 it has pushed ahead with implementing the Six Party Talks' (SPT) agenda for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula over the head of Japanese concerns that the North has essentially been rewarded for its "bad behavior" in conducting the missile and nuclear tests. Indeed, Japan's major fear is that as part of the SPT process it could be bounced into normalization with the North without satisfactory progress toward a resolution to the abductions issue, and that the US might even extend a negative security guarantee to North Korea, and even be prepared to tolerate the North's continued maintenance of nuclear weapons as long as it did not proliferate beyond the Korean Peninsula. Certainly for Japan, any US security arrangement with the North would be an anathema as it would raise questions about how far the US is willing to defend Japan from nuclear attack. 20 In this instance, the US's concern with achieving overall regional stability and its global goals of non-proliferation, might conflict with Japan's more immediate goals of removing North Korea as a nuclear threat, so raising concerns of the decoupling of Japan's security from that of the US. 21 Japanese policy-makers have also expressed quiet concerns recently that the US might sacrifice a resolution of the abductions issue in the course of pushing forward the SPT, although the new administration of Prime
Minister Fukuda Yasuo looks set to acquiesce in subverting this issue in the interests of achieving a resumption of bilateral normalization talks with North Korea and rehabilitating
Japan as an active player in Korean Peninsula diplomacy.
Japan and the "North Korean Peril"
Japan's threat perception and the consequent severity of its reaction to North Korea have been compounded by the increasing perception of the latter as a "terrorist state", which is implacably and possibly irrationally bent on the destruction of Japan, and is willing to practice any military stratagem to achieve its end, including the general terrorization of the Japanese population. North Korea has acquired this reputation through its own complicity in 16 the abductions of Japanese citizens, probable state sponsorship or at least tolerance of narcotics smuggling to Japan, and its provocative missile and nuclear testing actions.
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The result has been to generate a sense of the "North Korean peril" in Japan, manifested externally in its fushinsen activities, missile tests and involvement in abductions, and internally through the presence of the North Korean community. Elements of the Japanese policy-making community, media and general public have bought into, and in many cases actively propagated, the image of North Korea as rightly part of the "Axis of Evil", and Kim Jong-Il has an evil dictator somehow on a par, or perhaps in cahoots, with Osama Bin
Laden and al-Qaeda.
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The image of North Korea as terror state is reflected in the periodic scares seen in Japan over the threat it poses. The summer of 1999 was notable for being replete with fevered speculation in the media of another Taepdong neglecting to mention that, even though the sea carries Japan's name (although the two Koreas would question this), it is not actually Japanese territory and the missiles fell far closer to China, Russia, and to North Korea itself, than to Japan.
North Korea as a Catch-All Proxy Threat
Japan's sense of imperilment has not only helped to intensify changes in its military posture in direct reaction to the need to face down the North Korean threat, but has also helped to generate a catch-all source of threat and a general sense of crisis in Japan's security policy that has provided the legitimacy for other changes in defense capabilities and doctrines only marginally connected to the North, or even completely unconnected.
A notable aspect of Japan's security policy planning in the last decade has been the refusal to acknowledge explicitly that, alongside the threat from North Korea, China is also playing a significant role as a driver of change. Japan's traditional diplomatic deference toward China has declined in recent years, to the point that policy-makers have produced random comments about its presence as a security concern, but Japan clearly still fears antagonizing China if it were to openly identify it as a threat. Consequently, North Korea has come to fill the position of serving as the prime public legitimization for nearly all major changes in its security policy that are as equally or more addressed toward the looming threat from China. alliance planning and interoperability to respond to regional contingencies. Japan and US policy-makers thus sought to fill in the gaps in the Defense Guidelines by specifying for the first time the types of logistical cooperation that Japan could provide to the US in an Article 6-type regional contingency. Japan showed reluctance, as is usual in its security policy of exclusively defense-oriented defense, to identify explicitly the source of state threat forcing these upgrades to the alliance. However, Japanese official documents in their oblique language made it clear that they were in fact fixing on North Korea as the main threat to legitimate the way for these changes. The revised National Defense Program Outline of 1995, as the first step toward revising the Guidelines and in stressing the need for Japan to restructure its defense posture to deal with regional contingencies, named the Korean Peninsula (a codeword for North Korea) as an example of instability, but neglected, rather implausibly, to mention any concerns about China. Similarly, the April 1996 US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security which committed both states to revise the Defense Guidelines, stressed that these moves were necessitated by regional instability, but again only identified explicitly the Korean Peninsula and ignored all mention of China. The Joint Declaration's bypassing of mention of China strained all credulity, given that the previous month the US had deployed two aircraft carriers, including the Independence home-ported in Japan, to monitor the Taiwan Straits crisis.
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Japan's policy-makers during the period between the drafting of the revised
Guidelines from 1996 to 1997, and the passing of Japanese legislation to enable the implementation of logistical support for the US in regional contingencies, continued to maintain the fiction that these measures were not in any way aimed at China. The Japanese government persisted in particular with its argument that the scope of the revised Defense
Guidelines was "situational" rather than geographically specific, so as to leave ambiguous the position of Taiwan within the coverage of the US-Japan security treaty. However, Japanese policy-makers, despite their verbal contortions, eventually gave the game away. Katō Kōichi, having recently served as Chairman of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Committee, was reported to have told Chinese leaders on a visit to Beijing in July 1997 that the real concern of the revised Defense Guidelines was the Korean Peninsula and not China, but then Kajiyama Seiroku, as Chief Cabinet Secretary, countered this assertion a month later by stating that they did include Taiwan. 28 The Japanese government's preparedness to manipulate the catch-all North Korean threat was also shown in the run-up to the passing of the Guidelines legislation in 1999. Although it is unlikely ever to be proved, but as figures such as former Chief Cabinet
Secretary Nonaka Hiromu no less have argued, it was perhaps more than serendipity that Japan's defense establishment felt itself forced to intercept a North Korean fushinsen at exactly the same time as the Defense Guidelines-related legislation was being debated in the Diet and to thereby highlight Japan's threat environment and the need for a strong national response to potential security contingencies.
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North Korea's serving as a convenient and sole threat to be manipulated for disguising the fact that changes in Japan's defense posture are designed for dual purposes is also witnessed in justifications for BMD. Japan's "clear and present danger" in terms of ballistic missiles is undoubtedly North Korea, and the BMD program is currently driven primarily by this imperative. Nevertheless, Japanese policy-makers have often been disingenuous in neglecting to indicate that China is also a potential long-term object of the development and deployment of BMD. Japan's government certainly intends to deploy BMD assets to defend JSDF and US bases in the event of both Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Straits' contingencies, and is aware that in the event of the former it may face US demands to deploy the system around Taiwan.
Japan's Evolving Defense Posture and North Korea
Japan's ballooning threat perception of North Korea has subsequently triggered a range of changes to its defense posture, all of which indicate that both the substantial and accentuated perceptions of the threat from the North are contributing to its breaking away from the post-war constraints on its security policy.
Japan's National Defense Capabilities
As noted earlier, Japan since the first North Korean nuclear crisis has gone through 
Constitutional Prohibitions and Anti-militaristic Principles
Japan's reaction to North Korea has also precipitated change in the fundamental prohibitions governing its use of military force. Japanese procurement of in-flight refueling capabilities and interest in precision guided munitions and Tomahawk missiles has raised the question of whether this is leading to a possible breach of the anti-militaristic principle on the possession of offensive weaponry. There has been active discussion of whether Japan is looking to lift its ban on the use of pre-emptive force to respond to North Korean missile attacks; although thus far it has adhered to its consistent position since 1956 that Japan is permitted to launch strikes only when an aggressor has embarked on definite steps to attack
and not simply when it is feared to be about to attack, for Japan the latter being the definition of pre-emption. 33 Japan's temptation to transgress its anti-militaristic principles in order to respond to North Korea has also been shown by its intelligence satellite program, which has 
US-Japan Alliance Relations
As noted in earlier sections, North Korea's perceived threat to Japan has been multiplied by the fact that it has attacked the political basis of the alliance, so potentially prizing apart US and Japanese interests. Japan has thus reacted to the North Korean threat by seeking to strengthen political and military confidence in the US-Japan alliance so as to demonstrate its indispensability for Japanese and US interests regionally and globally. Japan in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear crisis thus sought to rehabilitate the alliance, through the revision of the NDPO and Defense Guidelines, so that it would function for actually advocated that Japan should yet breach the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, and it appears that currently the drivers for Japan as a potential nuclear proliferator are too weak.
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Firstly, Japan retains sufficient confidence in the US extended deterrent to mean that it sees no overwhelming national security threat from the North. Indeed, any move by Japan to go nuclear might only serve to alienate the US from Japan and worsen its security situation. In addition, Japan's acquisition of BMD and possible acquisition of conventional deterrence means such as the ability to strike North Korean missile bases should mean that it can counter North Korea without resort to its own nuclear weapons. Secondly, the fact that Japan has derived considerable international kudos from adhering to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, coupled with still very strong domestic anti-nuclear sentiment, means that there is no incentive for Japan to go nuclear in terms of international prestige and becoming respected as a great power. 39 Thirdly, Japan's dependence on civilian nuclear and fossil fuels from overseas means that if it were to acquire nuclear weapons that this could lead to its economic isolation and extreme energy vulnerability. Fourthly, Japan may have the technological capacity over the medium to long term to acquire nuclear weapons, but the effort of acquiring delivery systems, submarines and command and control systems would be very costly financially, and in the interim period Japan might risk losing its US nuclear umbrella, and any force de frappe developed would likely be a poor substitute for the full panoply of US nuclear capabilities. 40 Hence, at present the relatively weak North Korean nuclear threat is only 
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sufficient to force Japan to saber rattle and question its anti-nuclear taboos, although in the future any potential for a growing North Korean nuclear capacity and perceived decline in the US defensive commitment might cause a more serious reconsideration of Japan's stance.
Conclusion: Super-Sizing North Korea Super-Sizes Japan Militarily?
Japan's defense posture is growing in an almost exponential relationship with the North Korean threat. For sure, Japan is correct to entertain genuine concerns about the threat from the North, even as the actual degree of threat remains limited when measured in the cold light of day. However, for Japan the potency of the North Korean threat has come to be measured not simply in a straight calculation relating to the size and quality of its conventional forces and WMD, and the range of capabilities available to Japan and the US to deter it. Instead, Japan's perception of the threat is overly accentuated by the North's threat to the political basis of confidence in the US-Japan alliance; its ability to mesmerize, and to be exploited by, sections of Japanese policy-making opinion and the public as a "terrorist state";
and its role as a catch-all proxy threat to justify changes in security policy that are simultaneously driven by the greater long-term, but diplomatically unacceptable to articulate, threat from China. 28 not to have approached a level of threat necessary to fully break all military constraints, and certainly not to force any reconsideration of Japan's nuclear option. However, North Korea is certainly beginning to test Japan's military constraints to their limits and to legitimate the pushing outwards the envelope of Japan's re-emergence as a "normal" military power.
Perhaps most significantly in thinking through the impact on Japan's security policy trajectory, North Korea has now led it to begin to breach not just the anti-militaristic principles but now the deeper anti-militaristic norms that have crucially constrained its use of force in the post-war era. The JCG's (as already noted occupying the position of a "paranavy") interception and then eventual sinking of a North Korean fushinsen in 2001 demonstrated Japan's resolve not only to use force to defend its national interests but also to use lethal force if necessary. In this sense, Japan's "immovable" security policy in reaction to
North Korea is now gaining some trundling momentum.
